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All known qudit-based prepare-and-measure quantum key distribution (PMQKD) schemes are more error
resilient than their qubit-based counterparts. Their high error resiliency comes partly from the careful encoding
of multiple bits of signals used to generate the raw key in each transmitted qudit so that the same eavesdropping
attempt causes a higher bit error rate (BER) in the raw key. Here I show that highly-error-tolerant PMQKD
schemes can be constructed simply by encoding one bit of classical information in each transmitted qudit in the
form (|i〉 ± |j〉)/√2, where |i〉’s form an orthonormal basis of the 2n-dimensional Hilbert space. Moreover, I
prove that these schemes can tolerate up to the theoretical maximum of a 50% BER for n  2 provided the raw
key is generated under a certain technical condition, making them extremely-error-tolerant PMQKD schemes
involving the transmission of unentangled finite-dimensional qudits. This shows the potential of processing
quantum information using lower-dimensional quantum signals encoded in a higher-dimensional quantum state.
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Introduction. Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows two
cooperative players, Alice and Bob, to share a secret key whose
security is guaranteed by the laws of quantum mechanics.
Since the discovery of the first QKD scheme by Bennett
and Brassard [1], researchers have been studying different
aspects of QKD. New QKD protocols that are either more
practical, efficient, or error tolerant have been proposed.
Actual QKD experiments for some of the protocols have been
carried out. Unconditional security proofs, including those
covering realistic settings like the use of imperfect sources and
detectors, for many of these protocols have been found. (See,
for example, the review article in Ref. [2] for an overview.)
One line of research is to investigate the use of qudits rather
than qubits as quantum information carriers in the QKD. In
particular, Chau proved the unconditional security of a prepare-
and-measure quantum key distribution (PMQKD) scheme
(called Chau05) using 2n-dimensional quantum particles as
information carriers, each encoding n bits of the raw key [3].
Although his scheme has a very low key rate and is hard
to implement using current technology, it can tolerate a bit
error rate (BER) of up to 50% in the limit of n → +∞
[4]. This demonstrates the superior error-tolerant capability
of the qudit-based PMQKD scheme as the best qubit-based
PMQKD scheme known to date can only tolerate up to about
27.4% BER [5]. Recently, Sasaki et al. proposed a radically
different qudit-based PMQKD scheme known as the round-
robin differential-phase-shift (RRDPS) protocol in which
Alice encodes multiple bits si in each of the N -dimensional
qudit state as
1√
N
N∑
i=1
(−1)si |i〉 (1)
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so that Bob’s measurement can only reveal one of the (si −
sj )’s of his choice [6]. This is a conceptually important scheme
for it demonstrates that the security of the QKD need not
link to the Heisenberg uncertainty principle [7]. In terms of
performance, the RRDPS protocol can also tolerate up to a 50%
BER in the N → +∞ limit. In addition, if the BER of the raw
key is low, the key rate of the RRDPS protocol is much higher
than that of Chau05. Several proof-of-principle experiments
for the RRDPS protocol have been conducted [8–10].
Here I report a family of qudit-based PMQKD schemes
whose security comes from a different principle. In these
schemes, Alice and Bob randomly and independently prepare
and measure qubitlike states, each in the form (|i〉 ± |j 〉)/√2
in a 2n-dimensional Hilbert space for n  2 so that only one
bit of the raw key is encoded and transmitted in the phase
of each qudit state. (Here |i〉’s form an orthonormal basis
of the 2n-dimensional Hilbert space.) The security originates
from the fact that the eavesdropper Eve has a hard time
reading out a sizable portion of the raw key without being
caught because she does not know the preparation basis of
each qudit at the time when the quantum state is passing
through the insecure channel under her control. By identifying
|i〉 as the single-photon state in the ith optical pulse, these
schemes have the additional attractive feature that the prepared
states, which are essentially qubit states in diagonal basis,
can be easily created and measured using a standard optical
interferometer with variable path length. [Interestingly, the
experimental techniques used to prepare quantum states in
expression (1) in Refs. [8–10] can be adapted to prepare
the states (|i〉 ± |j 〉)/√2.] Using an aggressive entanglement
distillation procedure involving local operation and two-way
classical communications (LOCC2) originally reported in
Ref. [5], I prove that Alice and Bob could share a provably
secure secret key whenever the BER is less than 50% provided
that the raw key obeys the technical condition to be stated
in Eq. (2) later in the text, making it a family of PMQKD
schemes that saturates the theoretical maximum limit of the
tolerable BER using unentangled finite-dimensional quantum
information carriers. This opens up the study of processing
quantum information through the use of lower-dimensional
quantum states embedded in a higher-dimensional Hilbert
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space or transferred through a higher-dimensional quantum
channel.
Schemes. Let me denote the finite field of N ≡ 2n elements
by the Galois field GF(N ) and consider the following family
of schemes.
The family of PMQKD schemes.
(1) Alice randomly picks i = j ∈ GF(N ). She secretly
prepares a state in the form (|i〉 ± |j 〉)/√2 and sends it to
Bob through an insecure quantum channel.
(2) Bob randomly picks i ′ = j ′ ∈ GF(N ) and measures the
state along |i ′〉 ± |j ′〉. He keeps his measurement outcome
private.
(3) By announcing the pairs (i,j ) and (i ′,j ′) through an
unjammable classical channel, Alice and Bob establish a bit
of raw key from those states with (i,j ) = (i ′,j ′). (They adopt
the convention that [|i〉 + (−1)s |j 〉]/√2 encodes the bit s.)
They discard the measurement outcomes of those states with
(i,j ) = (i ′,j ′). They repeat steps 1–3 until they have a long
enough raw key.
(4) They estimate the BER of the raw key eb, namely, the
fraction of mismatched bits in their shared raw bit string, by
comparing (and then discarding) a small random sample of
the raw key. Using both accepted and rejected measurement
outcomes in step 3, they calculate the conditional probability
ec that a state is prepared and measured as (|i〉 ± |j 〉)/
√
2
given that it is prepared as (|i〉 ± |j 〉)/√2 and measured
as [|(1 − a)i + aj 〉 ± |(a + 1)j − ai〉]/√2 for some i,j,a ∈
GF(N ). [Note that all arithmetic in the state ket of a qudit
is performed in the finite field GF(N ) from now on.] They
continue only if
ebec + (N − 1)(1 − ec)
N − 2 <
1
2
. (2)
(5) Alice and Bob apply the following LOCC2 classical
postprocessing procedure to the remaining raw key adapted
from Ref. [5]. The values of the parameters k and r used in
this procedure will be discussed later.
(a) Alice and Bob randomly group their corresponding bits
in their remaining raw key in pairs. They reveal the parity
of each corresponding pair and keep the first bit in those
corresponding pairs whose parities agree. They repeat this
process k times.
(b) Alice and Bob randomly group their corresponding bits
in their remaining raw key in sets, each containing r bits. They
replace each set by the parity of the r bits in the set.
(c) Alice and Bob obtain their final secret key by applying
the Shor-Preskill privacy amplification procedure [5,11] to
these bits using a Calderbank-Shor-Steane code that could
correct up to, say, 1% quantum error.
Note that for the case of N = 4, the above scheme takes
a rather simple form. Alice and Bob keep those states that
are prepared and measured in diagonal basis of the same
Hilbert subspaceHij ≡ span(|i〉,|j 〉) for some i = j ∈ GF(4).
In addition, ec equals the length of the raw key divided by the
total number of qudits that are prepared in the subspace Hij
and measured in either Hij or Hab subspaces, where i,j,a,b
are the four distinct elements of GF(4).
Unconditional security proof. Now I show the uncondi-
tional security [12,13] of this family of PMQKD schemes for
N  4 by proving the unconditional security of the following
associated family of entanglement-distillation-based quantum
key distribution (EDQKD) protocols using the Shor-Preskill-
type argument [11].
The associated family of EDQKD protocols.
(1) Alice prepares the state ∑∈GF(2) |,〉/√2. She ran-
domly picks λ,β ∈ GF(N ) with λ = 0 and applies the linear
transformation
Lλβ |a〉 = |λa + β〉 (3)
for all a ∈ GF(N ) to the second qudit. She keeps the first
qudit and sends the second qudit to Bob through an insecure
quantum channel.
(2) Bob randomly picks λ′,β ′ ∈ GF(N ) with λ′ = 0 and
applies L−1λ′β ′ to the qudit he received from Alice. Then Alice
and Bob projectively measure their shared state along the basis
B = {|a〉 : a ∈ GF(N ), ∈ GF(2)}, (4)
where |a〉 ≡ [|0,a〉 + (−1)|1,a + 1〉]/2. They keep those
states in the form |κ〉 with κ ∈ GF(2) (which are regarded
as qubit pairs from now on) provided λ = λ′ and β = β ′. They
repeat steps 1 and 2 until they have a sufficient number of
shared qubits.
(3) Let ea be the conditional probability that the joint
measurement outcome in step 2 is |a〉 given that λ = λ′
and β = β ′. They continue only if
e01 + e11 + (N − 1)(e10 + e11) < 12 . (5)
(4) Alice and Bob perform the following entanglement
purification procedure adapted from Ref. [5].
(a) They randomly group their corresponding qubits in
tetrads, where each tetrad consists of two pairs shared by them.
Alice applies the unitary operation |ψκ,ψ〉 
→ |ψκ,ψκ+〉
to her share of the particles in the tetrad, where |ψκ〉 ≡
[|0〉 + (−1)κ |1〉]/√2; Bob does the same to his corresponding
particles in the tetrad. Alice and Bob keep their second qubit
pair if the measurement results of their first qubit pair in the
diagonal basis B× ≡ {ψ0,ψ1} agree. They repeat this process
k times.
(b) They randomly group their remaining qubits in sets,
each with r shared qubit pairs. They separately apply the
[r,1,r] majority-vote error correction code for the rectilinear
basis to their share of the qubits in each set.
(c) They apply a Calderbank-Shor-Steane code that could
correct up to a 1% quantum error of the remaining shared
quantum state to distill out almost perfect |00〉 Einstein-
Podolsky-Rosen pairs. Finally, by measuring each qubit of
these states along the diagonal basis B× Alice and Bob obtain
their secret key.
Clearly |a〉 = (I ⊗ XaZ)|00〉, where
Xa|b〉 = |a + b〉, Z|b〉 = (−1)N (b)|b〉 (6)
for all b ∈ GF(N ). Here N (b) = bN−1 is the norm of b [14].
Note that N (0) = 0 and N (b) = 1 if b = 0. Consider the
expression(
I ⊗ L−1λβ XaZLλβ
)|bκ〉
=
∑
ν∈GF(2)
(−1)κν+N (λ(ν+b)+β)|ν,ν + b + λ−1a〉 (7)
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for all λ = 0,β,a,b ∈ GF(N ) and ,κ ∈ GF(2). Up to an
irrelevant global phase, the right-hand side of Eq. (7) equals
|b+λ−1a,κ ′ 〉. Here κ ′ = κ if  = 0 or N (λb + β) = N (λ(b +
1) + β); otherwise κ ′ = κ + 1. Hence, the sequences of
probabilities of measurement outcome along B conditioned
on different λ = λ′ and β = β ′ in step 2 of the EDQKD
protocol transform from one to another by permutation. In
addition, all operations in step 4 except the final measurement
in the diagonal basis permute elements in B up to an irrelevant
phase. Therefore, Alice (Bob) may push the final measurement
in B× in step 4c forward in time to immediately after
step 1 (2) [5,15]. By renaming λ = j − i and β = i, I get
Lλβ |0〉 = |i〉 and Lλβ |1〉 = |j 〉. Consequently, this EDQKD
protocol is reduced to the PMQKD scheme. Furthermore, the
Shor-Preskill argument implies that the unconditional security
of the above PMQKD scheme follows that of the EDQKD
protocol [11].
I now proceed to analyze the security of the EDQKD proto-
col. Clearly, the probabilities ea obey
∑
a∈GF(N),∈GF(2) ea =
1. Since λ and β are randomly chosen for each transmitted
qudit and are unknown to Eve during the transmission, Eq. (7)
implies that
ea0 + ea1 = eb0 + eb1 (8)
for all nonzero a,b ∈ GF(N ). So, if Eq. (5) is satisfied, e00 >
1/2 is the greatest element among the ea’s. Furthermore,
by comparing the definitions of eb and ec in step 4 of the
PMQKD schemes with the definitions of the ea’s in step 3 of
the EDQKD protocols, I find the following correspondences:
ebec = (e01 + e11), (9)
ec = e00 + e10 + e01 + e11, (10)
and
1 − ec = (e10 + e11)(N − 2). (11)
Thus, Eq. (5) implies Eq. (2).
The probabilities that the joint measurement outcomes for
those remaining shared qubits just before step 4 of the EDQKD
protocol can be written as the elements of the 2 × 2 error matrix(
pI pz
px py
)
≡ 1
ec
(
e00 e01
e10 e11
)
. (12)
By treating each pair of shared qudits as a shared qubit pair,
then pI , px , py , and pz can be regarded as the probabilities
that Bob’s share of the qubit pair has suffered I , σx , σy , and σz
errors, respectively.
Note that in the above EDQKD protocol, step 4 is analogous
to a similar procedure in Ref. [5] with the roles of X and Z
errors being swapped. That is to say, step 4a is a variation
of the BXOR test [16,17] that reduces the Z error of the
resultant qubit pairs, whereas step 4b reduces the X error.
Applying Proposition 1 in Ref. [5] with the roles of X and
Z errors exchanged, the corresponding error matrix for the
shared qubits immediately after step 4a equals(
pkEPI p
kEP
z
pkEPx p
kEP
y
)
= 1
2(A + C)
(
A + B C + D
A − B C − D
)
, (13)
where A = (pI + px)2k , B = (pI − px)2k , C = (py + pz)2k ,
and D = (py − pz)2k . Since e00 > 1/2, so is pI . Hence
from Proposition 2 in Ref. [5] (again with X and Z errors
exchanged), the quantum error rate of the shared qubits can
be reduced to less than 1% after step 4b and therefore almost
perfect |00〉’s can be distilled in step 4c if the r in step 4b
equals 0.005/(pkEPy + pkEPz ) and 2r(1/2 − pkEPx − pkEPy )2 
1. Such an r exists if (B + D)2  400C(A + C). Since
pI > 1/2, pI − pz > px − py . Thus, r exists by picking a
sufficiently large k as long as
(pI − px)2 > (pI + px)(py + pz). (14)
(Incidentally, the same condition has been proven in Ref. [5]
for the special case of px = py = pz.) From Eqs. (9) and (12)
plus the fact that e00 + ebec + (N − 1)(1 − ec)/(N − 2) −
e11 = 1, the sufficient condition for the existence of r can
be rewritten as
f (eb,ec,e11) =
[
1 − ebec − N (1 − ec)
N − 2 + 2e11
]2
− eb(1 − eb)e2c > 0. (15)
The maximum tolerable BER emax of the EDQKD protocol
and hence the PMQKD scheme is the largest possible eb
provided that the parameters eb,ec,e11 pass the test in step 3 of
the EDQKD protocol. That is, emax = sup{eb : f (eb,ec,e11) >
0 ∀ec,e11; (eb,ec,e11) ∈ R}, whereR = {(eb,ec,e11) ∈ [0,1]3 :
ebec + (N − 1)(1 − ec)/(N − 2) < 1/2}. Since f is quadratic
in eb, ec, and e11, the value of emax can be calculated readily.
Specifically, elements inR obey 1 − ebec − N (1 − ec)/(N −
2) > 0. So, f (eb,ec,e11)  f (eb,ec,0) for all (eb,ec,e11) ∈ R.
Moreover, for any fixed eb ∈ [0,1/2) and by varying ec in
R, it is straightforward to see that f (eb,ec,0) is minimized
when ec = e∗c (eb) ≡ N/{2[N − 1 − (N − 2)eb]}. Finally, it is
easy to check that f (eb,e∗c (eb),0) > 0 if and only if eb ∈
[0,1/2) provided N  4. In summary, for (eb,ec,e11) ∈ R,
f (eb,ec,e11) > 0 whenever eb < 1/2. In addition, f → 0 as
e11 = 0, eb → 1/2, and ec → 1. Therefore, emax = 1/2; this
can be attained when Eve feeds every particle sent by Alice
through a completely dephasing channel before giving it to
Bob. By the standard composability definition of security for
the QKD [12,13], the family of EDQKD protocols for N  4
can therefore produce a shared secret key whenever the BER
is less then 50%.
To conclude, using the above family of PMQKD schemes,
Alice and Bob can establish a secure key whenever the BER of
the raw key is less than 50% provided N  4 and the accepted
data rate ec obeys Eq. (2). Since it is impossible to recover
any encoded classical message after sending through a binary
symmetric channel with crossover probability 1/2, this family
of PMQKD schemes shows that an extremely-error-tolerant
QKD scheme (as measured by its tolerable BER) can be
constructed by sending four-dimensional qubitlike qudits, each
containing a single bit of classical information encoded in its
phase. (Another extremely-error-tolerant scheme of this type
using four-dimensional qudits before this study was Chau05,
which can distill a secret key up to a 35.6% BER.) The security
of this family of schemes comes partly from the ability to
deduce the X-error rate through a clever use of the accepted
data rate ec in step 4. This opens up additional possibilities
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for doing quantum information processing through carefully
designed algorithms that send lower-dimensional quantum
states through a higher-dimensional channel.
Outlook. So far, the analysis is restricted to the case of
an ideal source and detectors in the arbitrarily long raw key
length limit. One still needs to investigate the security and
performance of this family of schemes for realistic sources
(say, by a decoy state method [18–20]) and detectors (say, by
measurement-device-independent techniques [21,22]) in the
finite-key-length setting [23–26] using one-way or two-way
classical postprocessing.
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